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Som-theme B  Market and interactions between firms
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This article reports the results of an empirical study focusing on the relationship between
the relative bargaining power of partners in an IJV, the division of control between the
partners, the level of trust, and the performance of the IJV. In this study, we combined the
structural and the behavioural approaches towards IJV management and evaluated their
respective effect on IJV performance. Survey research was used to collect data. Research
evidence indicated that the division of control was, to a large extent, explained by the
relative resource contributions of the partners and the stakes the partners have in the IJV.
Trust was influenced by the availability of alternatives. The performance of the IJV was
influenced more by trust than by control and its dimensions. This indicates that companies
should not solely concentrate on control, but should focus more on trust and the relationship
with the partner.
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Over the past two decades there has been a substantial increase in the formation of
Joint Ventures (JVs) and Strategic Alliances. This is in contrast to management
preference in the past for maintaining autonomy and control and doing business
alone if possible (Contractor & Lorange 1988). Although JVs are becoming
increasingly more important for attaining competitive as well as strategic
objectives, they still have a reputation for being difficult to manage. The
importance of managing JVs is reflected in the extensive literature on this topic,
which has focused primarily on ex ante structuring of JVs (see Parkhe 1993 for a
review). The underlying premise of several studies (see e.g., Contractor and
Lorange 1988, Geringer & Hebert 1989) is that choosing the right partner and
using (ownership) control are critical determinants of JV success. This represents
the structural perspective of JVs. Recently, there has been more interest in
mechanisms and concepts, like trust and flexibility, that are important for the ex
post maintenance of the JV or the behavioural approach (see e.g., Parkhe 1993,
Madhok 1995).
The major purposes of this paper are to combine the two streams of JV literature
(behavioural and structural approach) and investigate how they relate to the
performance of a JV. By combining these two approaches, it is possible to evaluate
the importance of each approach in an integral manner. In other words, the central
research questions of this paper are: how do dimensions of bargaining power
influence the division of control and level of trust, and how important is trust and
(or versus) control for explaining the performance of the JV? We have developed a
model to evaluate performance in JVs. In this model, the bargaining power,
control, trust, and performance are integrated. It is based on the interpartner
bargaining perspective on JVs as described by Harrigan (1986) and Yan and Gray
(1994), in which the partners co-operate and compete simultaneously in the JV.
The relative bargaining power of the partners shapes the pattern of control and
3trust that a JV adopts. In addition, trust and control are hypothesised to be critical
factors that determine performance. In earlier studies, research findings on the
relationship between control and performance showed mixed results (see Geringer
& Hebert 1989 for a review). With this study, we hope to get a clearer picture of
how bargaining power influences the division of control and the level of trust and,
consequently, their effect on the perceived performance of the joint venture.
As stated, we have adopted a bargaining perspective to explain the distribution of
control between the JV partners. It is suggested that the relative bargaining power
of partners is a critical variable in determining the division of control between the
partners (Harrigan 1986, Blodgett 1991 and Yan & Gray 1994).
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Bargaining power refers to a bargainer’s ability to favourably change the
‘bargaining set’ to win accommodations from the other party and influence the
outcome of a negotiation (Yan & Gray 1994). According to Hamel (1991: 100):
‘Bargaining power is a function of who needs whom the most’. In a JV, each
partner contributes resources and skills that serve as input for the joint venture
and, therefore, each partner possesses a degree of bargaining power. As a result,
both partners are dependent on the other’s contribution and effort for the success
of the JV. The relative power of one partner resides implicitly in the subordination
of the other.
The bargaining theory (Bacharach & Lawler 1981) and the resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) can explain bargaining power. The bargaining
theory states that the VWDNHV of the bargainers in a negotiation and the DYDLODELOLW\
RIDOWHUQDWLYHV influence their bargaining power. Yan and Gray (1994) use the term
‘FRQWH[WEDVHGEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU’ to identify these stakes and alternatives in the
bargaining power. A stake is a bargainer’s level of dependence on a negotiation
relationship and on its outcomes. When a partner is very dependent on these
4negotiations, his bargaining power is low. Thus, stakes are negatively related to
bargaining power.
The alternatives available to negotiators specify the extent to which they can
choose different arrangements for achieving the same goals sought in the
negotiation (Harrigan 1986). The bargaining partner who has more alternatives is
more powerful because he can threaten to walk away from the current bargaining
in order to achieve his objective.
The resource dependence theory suggests that the possession of or control over
critical resources constitutes bargaining power. Yan and Gray (1994) have used
the term ‘UHVRXUFHEDVHG EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU’. If a company contributes more
critical resources to the joint venture, this partner will be more powerful than the
other partner (Harrigan 1986). A partner gains bargaining power if the joint
venture depends heavily on the resources it contributes that are ‘costly or
impossible for other partners to replace’ and critical to the joint venture’s success
(Yan & Gray 1994). In this study, we will focus on the effect of the three
dimensions of  bargaining power: stakes, alternatives and resource-based
bargaining power.
&RQWURO
Control refers to the process by which a partner of a JV influences the other partner
to behave in a certain way through the use of power, authority, and a wide range of
bureaucratic, cultural, and informal mechanisms (Geringer & Hebert 1989:
236/237). The importance of control to a certain partner depends mainly on the
strategic role or mission of the JV for that partner. The greater the strategic
importance, the more that partner wants to control the JV (Root 1988).
The extent of control identifies which partner makes the larger number of strategic
and operational decisions for the JV (Killing 1983).
A major cause for dissatisfaction with the management of JVs is that a dual
hierarchy, arising as a result of shared ownership, results in a high potential for
5conflict (Madhok 1995). This can interfere with the actual operations of the JV,
and ineffectiveness and uncertainty can arise. One approach towards overcoming
the difficulties in managing JVs suggests that paying attention to the JV’s social
relations, such as trust, is as important as ownership control (Parkhe 1993, Madhok
1995).
7UXVW
The social dimension in which a relationship is embedded is important for the
success of that relationship. Forcing decisions by means of formal control/power
would be a short-term victory and might threaten the joint venture in the long run
(Killing 1983). Trust is often considered to be a very important ingredient of
managing relationships. We define trust as the willingness to rely on a partner in
whom one has confidence (Moorman et al. 1992). This definition of trust reflects
two distinct components: credibility and benevolence. Trust based on a partner’s
expertise and reliability focuses on the objective credibility of a partner (Ganesan
1994). This credibility is based on the extent to which partner A believes that
partner B has the required expertise to perform the job effectively and reliably.
Benevolence focuses on the motives and intentions of the partner. A benevolent JV
partner is motivated by a concern for the well-being of the relationship itself, and
will not improve its own welfare at the expense of its partner’s interest (Kumar et
al. 1995). This perception of benevolence induces behaviour in the interest of the
JV relationship and reduces the need for monitoring (Madhok 1995). It is often
argued that trust can replace hierarchical governance, accomplishing interfirm
organisational objectives when ownership-based control is neither strategically
viable nor economically feasible (Parkhe 1993, Madhok 1995).
3HUIRUPDQFH
Performance and performance measurement have received a lot of attention in JV
literature. A major issue that is subject to considerable debate concerns the
appropriate methods to be used when measuring JV performance (Beamish &
6Delios 1997b). In summarising prior empirical JV research, Geringer and Hebert
(1991) point out that early studies relied on a variety of financial indicators, such
as profitability, growth, and cost position. Other studies have used objective
measures, like survival of the JV, its duration, and instability of the JV ownership
(Killing 1983, Beamish & Delios 1997b). Killing (1983) noted that financial and
objective measures may fail to adequately reflect the extent to which a JV has
achieved its short- and long-term objectives. It is possible that a JV operates in a
context where objective and financial performance measures suggest that the
venture is performing poorly, while the JV has been meeting or exceeding the
parent company’s objectives (Geringer & Hebert 1991). Therefore, they have
suggested that a subjective performance measurement has to be taken into account,
as well.
7+(02’(/
In this section, we shall present a model that integrates the concepts of bargaining
power, management control, trust and performance. The proposed conceptual
model is displayed in Figure 1.
***********************
Put Figure 1 about here
***********************
Prior research has attempted to articulate the relationship between the bargaining
power of the partners and the level of control they exercise (Yan & Gray 1994).
Killing (1983) reported that the partner’s respective contributions shaped the
control structure of the JVs. Root (1988) stated that the importance of control to a
given partner depends on the strategic role of the JV for that partner. The greater
the significance of an arrangement for the growth and profitability of a partner (or
the strategic importance), the more that partner wants to control the JV. To get
more control, a firm can make the JV or the partner more dependent on the
availability of the firm’s proprietary resources that would be costly or impossible
7for the partner to replace. In other words, a company should improve its bargaining
position. If the importance of a certain contribution or resource is high, then the
partner that contributes this resource will have more (resource-based) bargaining
power and can claim more control as a result. There is a negative relationship
between the stakes of bargaining power and control. If the stakes are high, a
company will be dependent on the joint venture and, as a result, can claim little
control. When a company has many alternatives to get access to a certain asset or
contribution, it is less dependent on one particular party. As a result, the company
has relatively more bargaining power and can claim relatively more control.
Based on this prior research and the discussion of the three concepts of bargaining
power and control, we argue that the relative bargaining power of the focal
company influences the focal company’s level of control. Specifically, we
hypothesize:
+\SRWKHVLVD 7KHPRUH UHVRXUFHEDVHG EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU WKH IRFDO FRPSDQ\
KDVWKHPRUHFRQWUROWKHIRFDOFRPSDQ\KDV
+\SRWKHVLVE 7KH PRUH EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU WKH IRFDO FRPSDQ\ KDV EDVHG RQ
DOWHUQDWLYHVWKHPRUHFRQWUROWKHIRFDOFRPSDQ\KDV
+\SRWKHVLVF 7KH KLJKHU WKH VWDNHV RI WKH MRLQW YHQWXUH UHODWLRQVKLS IRU WKH
IRFDOFRPSDQ\WKHORZHUFRQWUROWKHIRFDOFRPSDQ\KDV
In a relationship where one partner is powerful, the powerful partner does not need
to cultivate its partner’s trust (Kumar et al. 1995). It can use its power to obtain its
partner’s co-operation. The risks of the powerful company are greater if it provides
relatively more resources;it has more to lose. Its perception of trustworthiness of
its partner will be relatively low. If it has more bargaining power based on
alternatives, it has the possibility of changing to an alternative partner. It does not
have to invest in trust building. If the stakes in the joint venture relationship of the
focal company are high, it is important for the focal company to have a good
8relationship with its partner and, therefore, it has an incentive to develop trust.
Anderson and Weitz (1989) provided evidence that in asymmetric power
relationships, the relationships are less trusting than in symmetric relationships. In
an asymmetric power relationship, the fear of exploitation will be higher (Bucklin
& Sengupta 1993); thus, the partners will focus more on monitoring their partner’s
behaviour and input for possible signs of exploitation. Also, the dependent partner
is unlikely to trust, because such sentiments render it more vulnerable to its
partner’s opportunism. As the power asymmetry increases, conditions become
more aversive to the development of trust (Kumar et al. 1995).
+\SRWKHVLVD 7KHPRUH UHVRXUFHEDVHG EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU WKH IRFDO FRPSDQ\
KDVWKHORZHULWVWUXVWLQWKHSDUWQHU
+\SRWKHVLVE 7KH PRUH EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU WKH IRFDO FRPSDQ\ KDV EDVHG RQ
DOWHUQDWLYHVWKHORZHULWVWUXVWLQWKHSDUWQHU
+\SRWKHVLVF 7KH KLJKHU WKH VWDNHV RI WKH MRLQW YHQWXUH UHODWLRQVKLS IRU WKH
IRFDOFRPSDQ\WKHKLJKHULWVWUXVWLQWKHSDUWQHU
The control-performance relationship has received relatively little attention in the
literature, and the studies that have been done show contradictory results (see
Geringer & Hebert 1989 for a review). According to Killing (1983), a critical
determinant of JV performance appears to be the control exercised by parents over
a JV’s activities. He asserted that, among his three JV categories, dominant-parent
JVs are more likely to be successful, at least compared with shared-management
JVs. Based on a transaction cost perspective, he argued that since the presence of
two parents constitutes the major management difficulty in JVs, dominant-parent
JVs, in which the venture activities are dominated by a single parent, will be easier
to manage and, consequently, will be more successful. Dominant-parent JVs are a
mechanism for reducing the risks associated with co-ordination, potential conflicts,
9and, consequently, for minimising transaction costs and stabilising the JV
(Geringer & Hebert 1989).
+\SRWKHVLV $ -9 FRQWUROOHG E\ RQH RI WKH SDUWQHUV UHVXOWV LQ KLJKHU
SHUIRUPDQFH
In interviews with JV managers and managers from the parent companies, we have
often heard opinions such as: ”The most important factor in the success of our JV
is trust between the partners.” The direction of the relationship has generally been
put forward as trust leading to performance (Harrigan 1986), although Yan and
Gray (1994) suggested that performance may also have a feedback effect on trust.
The rationale for the trust-to-performance relationship is that trust ensures a sound
and co-operative working relationship between the partners. Trust influences
performance in three ways. First, it reduces the perception of risk associated with
the behaviour of the other partner. Second, it increases the confidence of the focal
partner that short-term inequities will be resolved over a longer period. Third, it
reduces the transaction costs in a joint venture relationship, because of lower
monitoring costs. The higher the level of trust, the more efficient the JV will be in
transforming an input of co-operation into a collaborative output (Buckley &
Casson 1988). Thus, in the long run, partnership trust can have important positive
JV performance and efficiency implications (Parkhe 1993).
+\SRWKHVLV 7KHUHLVDSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWUXVWDQGSHUIRUPDQFH
Yan and Gray (1994) suggested that trust can have a moderating effect on the
control-performance relationship. In a JV that is characterised by a high level of
trust, partners do not focus strictly on control. There is no need for direct
monitoring. By developing trust, partners invest in the relationship and create a
collaborative atmosphere. They will behave in such a way that they will not harm
this atmosphere. Therefore, trust may counterbalance the temptation and fear of
10
opportunism, thereby lowering the need for direct control. Thus, a high level of
trust will result in a lower effect of control on performance.




The data for this study were obtained through a questionnaire. We used three
selection criteria to construct our research sample: time period, parent nationality,
and number of participants.
The first criterion was an attempt to capture the recent growth of JVs (Beamish &
Delios 1997a). JVs that were founded during the period from 1989-1994 were
selected. By looking at the foundation date, we also included JVs that were
terminated at the time of our study. Furthermore, it was easier to identify the
‘right’ respondents. Most respondents approached were involved in the JV for the
whole period and knowledgeable about the developments in the JV relationship.
The second criterion allowed us to focus on the Dutch partners of the JV.
Questionnaires were sent only to the Dutch partner(s) of the JV because of time,
funding, and access constraints. Finally, we concentrated on (Dutch) JVs with only
two partners, since a majority (80%) of the JVs are between two partners
(Jagersma & Bell 1992). It can be expected that JVs with more than two partners
will face other problems. Also, prior research has primarily focused on two-partner
JVs (see e.g., Geringer & Hebert 1991, Yan & Gray 1995, Glaister & Buckley
1998). Taken together, these three criteria generated a domain of inquiry that was
both relevant and significant and that met the needs of this research.
Data collection proceeded in three phases. First, we developed a sampling frame of
JVs that were founded. This data was gained primarily from announcements of
starting JVs in +HW )LQDQFLHHOH ’DJEODG, annual reports of Dutch companies
11
registered at the Dutch stock exchange, and the )XVLH DQG 2YHUQDPH GLVN of
Delwel (1993, 1994). This process resulted in a sample of 319 JVs with 393 Dutch
partners. Second, the companies were contacted to check the information and to
obtain the name of an executive in each firm that was likely to be able to complete
the survey for the particular JV. Third, after screening these JVs and contacting the
parent companies, the sample was decreased to 242 Dutch JV partners, to whom
we sent the questionnaire1. A reminder was sent to non-respondents and finally 95
executives responded, which is a response rate of 39%. Eighteen responses were
not usable because data were missing, the JV involved more than two partners, or
the JV was formed outside of our research time period, leaving 77 usable
responses (32%). This response rate significantly exceeded the 9-24 percent range
reported in similar published studies (e.g., Cullen et al. 1995). Possible non-
response bias was examined by comparing early and late respondents. We found
no significant difference (p>.05) between early and late respondents for any of our
constructs, which suggests that non-response bias was not a problem.
The majority of the joint ventures were formed with partners from Europe (47),
followed by America (12) and Asia (9). A total of 47 focal companies are in the
manufacturing sector, 19 in services and 12 in other sectors (e.g., non-profit). For
the sample as a whole, 60 joint ventures were still in existence at the moment of
the survey, while 18 joint ventures had been terminated. The average JV duration
was 3.2 years.
0HDVXUHV
Multi-item scales were used to operationalise the independent and dependent
variables. All the measures used in the study are listed in the Appendix.
%DUJDLQLQJSRZHU
To measure bargaining power, we made a distinction between resource-based
bargaining power and context-based bargaining power (Yan & Gray 1994).
Resource-based bargaining power was measured by listing 9 possible resource
12
contributions by the partners (based on Contractor & Lorange 1988). The
respondents were asked to assess the importance of each resource contribution for
the success of the JV and to estimate the relative contribution of each partner. By
multiplying the importance of the contribution by the relative contributions of the
partners and equally weighting each type of resource contribution, a score was
constructed for the overall relative contribution of the partners. A positive score on
the resource-based bargaining power scale means that the focal company is
powerful and a negative score means that the focal company is dependent.
Context-based bargaining power was measured by two dimensions. The stakes of
bargaining power were measured by two items and were based on the sales and
profit approach used in the distribution literature (Kumar et al 1998). We asked the
respondent to give an indication of the importance of the JV for the focal
company, as well as an assessment of the partner’s position (a high score implies
great importance). By subtracting the focal company’s score from the partner’s
score, we got an indication of the relative importance of the JV. A positive score
on the stakes construct implies that the JV is relatively more important for the
partner than for the focal company. Thus, a positive score implies that the focal
company has more bargaining power.
The availability of the alternatives refers to the number and attractiveness of
alternative partners a party may have and is based on Heide and John (1988) and
Ganesan (1994). It is measured by three items (a high score implies few
alternatives). We asked for the availability of the alternative partners for the focal
company as well, to give an indication of the partners’ position. By subtracting the
focal companies’ scores from the partners’ scores, we got an indication of the
relative bargaining power. A negative score on this construct implies that the focal
company has relatively few alternatives and, therefore, is relatively dependent. A
positive score implies that the focal company has relatively many alternatives and,
as a consequence, is relatively powerful.
13
For measuring control, the respondents were asked to assess the extent of joint
decision making for a list of ten issues in the management of the JV (five strategic
and five operational issues2). This scale was based on the scale of Cullen et al.
(1995). The different items were weighted equally to get an overall score for
control.
Our definition of trust encompasses two essential dimensions: credibility and
benevolence. The scale for measuring credibility was based on Kumar et al. (1995)
and Ganesan (1994). For benevolence we used the scale of Kumar et al. (1995).
For measuring the concept of trust, it was decided to equally weight the scores of
credibility and benevolence, in order to get an overall score on the level of trust. A
high score on this construct implies a high level of trust between the partners.
Our perceptual measure of performance encompasses financial as well as
operational measures (Cullen et al. 1995). The measure addressed whether the JV
met or exceeded expectations concerning profitability (financial) market share
(operational) and overall success. An overall score on JV performance was gained
by taking the mean of the items scores, resulting in an overall score on
performance ranging from 1 (poor performance) to 5 (good performance).
’DWD$QDO\VLV
Data analysis proceeded in two steps. In the first step, the procedure to evaluate the
validity and reliability of the constructs, as described by Steenkamp and Van Trijp
(1991), was followed. We started by testing each construct for unidimensionality by
performing an exploratory factor analysis. Then, we looked at the item-total
correlation and the Cronbach alphas of the unidimensional constructs to see whether
the reliability was satisfactory. We concluded this step with confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) using LISREL 8 with maximum likelihood estimation3 (Jöreskog &
Sörbom 1996). We used the covariance matrix as input matrix. The CFA involved
the measures of trust (benevolence and credibility) and performance. Bargaining
power and control were not included in the CFA, because they were conceptualised
14
as formative indicators or multidimensional composite indices (Bollen & Lennox
1991, Kumar et al. 1995). Based on the formative properties of these measures,
conventional validation methods based on association are not appropriate. The
results of the reliability and validity tests are summarised in the appendix.
In the second step of the analysis, the hypotheses were tested using regression
analysis. The hypotheses were tested by estimating the subsequent regression
equation for each of our independent variables (control, trust and performance).
5(6($5&+),1’,1*6
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviation and correlations between the
dependent and independent variables. To test the hypotheses, we used the ordinary
least square procedure; the aptness of the hypothesised model for the data was
tested by an analysis of residuals.
***********************
Put Table 1 about here
***********************
Table 2 summarises the results of the OLS regression analysis of the three
independent dimensions of bargaining power, the dimensions of control and trust.
The regression equations are significant, at least at the 0.05 level, except for
strategic control. We can also see that total control is significantly related only to
resource-based bargaining power (H1a). The context-based bargaining power
dimensions have the expected signs but are not significant. We have to reject H1b
and H1c. To find an explanation for this lack of support, we divide control into
operational and strategic control. Strategic control is not influenced by either
resource- or context-based bargaining power. Operational control, however, is
influenced by resource-based bargaining power and the stakes of the joint venture
for the partners (at the 5% level). We might conclude that there is a different
relationship between bargaining power and strategic and operational control. The
division of strategic control is not influenced by the relative bargaining power of
15
the partners. When entering a joint venture, the partners expect that they will have
to share control over strategic issues despite their relative bargaining power.
Bargaining power has, however, a direct effect on the division of operational
control. Both the contributed resources and the stakes of the joint venture
influence the division of operational control. If a company has strong bargaining
power, it can also claim strong operational control.
***********************
Put Table 2 about here
***********************
We have found support for H2a and H2b. This implies that trust is influenced by
the bargaining power based on alternatives and the contributed resources of the
partners. If the focal company has more alternatives, it does not need to cultivate
its partner’s trust. The same holds for bargaining power based on the contributions
of the partners. We have to reject H2c.
H 3 states that a joint venture that is dominated by one partner will perform better4.
Trust is hypothesised to positively influence performance (H4) and mitigate the
effects of control on performance (H5). To test for this effect, we constructed an
interaction term by multiplying trust and control5. Table 3 shows the results of the
regression analysis of control and trust on performance. Individual beta
coefficients do support H 4, indicating that trust has a significant impact on
performance. H 3 and H 5 are not supported. Furthermore, a distinction between
operational and strategic control does not have any influence on the results.
Therefore, trust is a more important indicator of performance than control (ß= .68,
p < .01).
***********************




The primary objective of our study was to address the concerns of Yan and Gray
(1994) that insufficient empirical attention has been paid to combinations of
several important concepts in the joint venture literature, especially bargaining
power, control, trust, and performance. In this study, we combined the structural
with the behavioural perspective of JV management. We tried to find evidence for
our model, which is an extension of the Yan & Gray model. The latter, however,
was based on qualitative data, while in our study, an initial empirical effort was
made to use more quantitative data based on a sample of Dutch joint ventures.
Hypothesis testing yielded (partial) support for our hypotheses. First of all, we
found partial support for the relationship between bargaining power and control. In
particular, resource-based bargaining power seemed to be a good predictor of
several dimensions of control, as well as the level of trust. This is in line with the
findings of Root (1988) and Blodgett (1991), who stated that contributions of
resources are good predictors of control. Bargaining power based on stakes
influences operational control. Relatively high stakes imply relatively low
bargaining power and, consequently, relatively low operational control. These
findings might imply that control is more internally oriented (stakes and
resources). Bargaining power based on alternatives is more related to trust. Thus,
the level of trust is partially based on an external perspective (i.e., the availability
of alternatives).
We did not find support for the control-performance hypotheses. This finding
contradicts a widely held assumption that suggests bargaining power or ownership
is necessary for effective control of a firm’s partner, implying that their
performance depends on the focal company’s ownership control. Our findings
might imply that direct control is not that important for the performance of the
joint venture.
17
Finally, recent research on joint ventures has stressed a need for understanding
behavioural and social dynamics in joint ventures. One such dimension is the
degree of trust that exists between the partners in a joint venture, which might
become a functional substitute for hierarchical control, such as ownership control.
This study builds on the behavioural approach of interorganisational governance
by examining the role of trust in combination with control on the performance of
the joint venture. The empirical results of this study suggest that trust in a
relationship might be a better indicator of performance than control. Therefore,
more informal mechanisms of control, i.e., behavioural aspects like trust, might be
more important than formal and structural mechanisms like equity or the extent of
control.
0$1$*(0(17,03/,&$7,216
There are three significant implications of the study’s findings. First, the division
of control is basically explained by the relative contribution of each partner and
the importance of that contribution for the success of the joint venture and the
availability of alternatives. This implies that there is a focus on the competitive
needs of the joint venture itself, i.e., the resources the joint venture needs to
survive in its environment and whether or not there are alternatives that can
contribute to these resources. During the negotiations, the companies in the joint
venture look at one another’s relative strengths and also focus on the existence of
possible alternatives. Therefore, the result of the negotiations (i.e., the division of
control) is based on the importance of the relative contributions and the possible
alternatives.
Second, there is a clear distinction between operational and strategic control.
Although these two concepts are strongly correlated (ρ = 0.63), they are two
separate concepts. The division of strategic control is not explained by the relative
bargaining power. It seems that the division of strategic control is decided upon
before the real negotiations start. When companies start talking about a joint
18
venture, they know that they have to share strategic control. There might also be
other aspects that explain the division of strategic control. Operational control is
explained by the relative contributions of the partners and the stakes. This might
imply that a company has to use a different negotiation strategy with respect to
operational and strategic control.
Third, the results suggest that individual firm objectives in a partnership and the
performance goals can be met without a strict focus on formal mechanisms of
control and ownership control. In fact, attempts at formal control of the JV might
have an adverse impact on JV performance if these attempts have a negative effect
on trust. Thus, firms should rely more on social interactions and trust, rather than
formal control mechanisms, to maintain their JV and enhance the performance of
the JV.
/,0,7$7,216$1’)8785(5(6($5&+
Though this study addresses behavioural issues and structural aspects of JVs to
identify the antecedents of performance, the findings should be evaluated in the
light of the following limitations. First of all, the study used cross-sectional data,
thus preceding an explanation of the dynamic effects of bargaining power, control,
trust and performance. This becomes particularly crucial because two-way causal
linkages have been suggested in the literature between, for example, control and
performance. Similarly, the trust-performance relationship could be reciprocal;
that is, trust leads to performance, but improved performance may also build trust.
Second, our results were based on information obtained from only one side of the
JV. We attempted to obtain data from both partners; however, it was, for example,
very difficult or not possible to identify the key informant of the (foreign) partner.
Since some variables in the study were bilateral, data collection from only one
partner did not capture all aspects of the relationship, and the findings should be
interpreted accordingly. Future research is encouraged that uses responses from
both partners of the JV.
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Third, the control-performance relationship proved to be more complex than
formulated in our hypothesis. Future research should be undertaken to better
understand this relationship. It might be necessary to incorporate intervening or
moderating variables like the nationality of the partner or institutionalisation of the
goals as Yan & Gray (1994) suggested. Also the level of control might have an
impact on the desired level of control.
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$SSHQGL[0HDVXUHV
5HVRXUFHEDVHGEDUJDQLQJSRZHU:
Contribution importance (1= completely unimportant, 5= very important)
Relative contribution (-2 = entirely partner, 0 = equal, 2= entirely own company)
Market access/knowledge of local market, Technology, Access to capital, Access
to distribution channels, Access to raw materials, Access to human resources,
Local identity, Contact with government, Management know-how
$OWHUQDWLYHV: (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree)
It is difficult to replace our partner.
We have many alternative ways of replacing our partner.(r)
We are dependent on our partner.
6WDNHV: (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree)
The joint venture makes a considerable contribution to profits
The joint venture makes a considerable contribution to sales
7UXVW CFA results (two factor model): χ2(12)=19.46, (p=.08), AGFI=.87,
NNFI=.95, CFI=.97
7UXVWFUHGLELOLW\: (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree) α=.79
We can count on our partner being honest.
Our partner always keeps promises.
23
We accept explanations that seem unlikely because we are sure that our partner is
telling the truth.
Our partner provides information that later turns out to be incorrect. (r)
7UXVWEHQHYROHQFH: (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree) α=.83
Our partner has an understanding of our problems.
When making decisions about the joint venture, our partner takes the
consequences for our company into account.
We can count on our partner’s support in matters that are important to our
company.
([WHQW RI FRQWURO: Who makes the following decisions; (1= completely partner,
3= equal, 5= completely own company)
Development of the organisational structure, Planning and budgeting, Personnel
policy of the management, Personnel policy of the implementing staff,
Interpretation of the co-operation agreement, Changes in the co-operation
agreement, Strategic policy, Day-to-day policy, Distribution of profit, Agreements
between the joint venture and the partners
3HUIRUPDQFH (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree) α=.85
Based on the standardised residuals, item 2 was deleted, loading of one item set to
1
CFA results: χ2(1)=.05, p=.82, AGFI=.99, NNFI=1.03, CFI=1.00
The joint venture is more profitable than expected.
The joint venture has shown less growth potential than expected. (r)
In general, we regard the joint venture as successful.
The joint venture’s products have not achieved the intended market share. (r)
(r) = reverse code
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Variables MEAN SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 RESOURCE-BASED 1.07 2.69 1.00
2 ALTERNATIVES .30 1.07 .25** 1.00
3 STAKES .38 1.22 .10 .19* 1.00
4 CONTROL 3.23 0.65 .37***   .15 -.12     1.00
5 OPERAT. CONTROL 3.31 0.99 .41***   .14 -.19* .97*** 1.00
6 STRAT. CONTROL 3.16 0.44 .17      .13      .06 .81*** .63***  1.00
7 TRUST 3.40 0.85 -.29** -.36*** -.12 .11 .11     .07 1.00
8 PERFORMANCE 3.35 1.00 -.16 -.24** -.05 .08 .08     .06 .68*** 1.00
7DEOH&RUUHODWLRQPDWUL[
* p <.10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01
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7DEOH5HVXOWVRIUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLVIRUFRQWURODQGWUXVWD
total control operat. control strat. control trust
Resource-based barg. power .36*** .42*** .14 -.21*
Context-based barg. power
alternatives .09 .08 .09 -.30***
stakes -.17 -.24** .03 -.04
R2 .17 .23 .04 .17
adj R2 .13 .20 .00 .14
F 4.87*** 7.18*** .97 5.09***
a
 Entries represent standardised regression coefficients.
* p <.10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01
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7DEOH5HVXOWVRIUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLVIRUSHUIRUPDQFHD





Control * Trust -.02
Operational control * Trust .02
Strategic control * Trust -.04
R2 .46 .46
adj R2 .44 .43
F 20.52*** 12.21***
a
 Entries represent standardised regression coefficients.
*p<.10 ** p < .05  *** p < .01
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 (Based on Yan & Gray (1994))
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1Some joint ventures were never founded, not international, the parent company did not
exist anymore, the company was not willing to cooperate, or the company filled in only one
questionnaire (some companies founded more than 20 joint ventures in this period).
2
 In our study, we shall make a distinction between these two dimensions of control.
3
 Although WLS estimations should be used for ordinal scales, we used ML estimators.
WLS requires a large sample size. If the sample size is small (as in our case), the
assumption of multinormality holds, and if there are minor skewness and kurtosis (not
exceeded | 1| ), ML estimators can be used (Bollen 1989: 432).
4
 To test these hypotheses, we had to adjust the control scale in such a way that dominance
would be clear. We subtracted 3 (the value for shared control) and took the absolute value.
Shared control is represented by a score of zero, total dominance of one of the partners by a
score of 2.
5
 The concepts were mean centered to reduce multicollinearity (Jaccard et al. 1991).
